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BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES 
INTRODUCTION 
In fiscal year 2018, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) 
searched 33,295 electronic devices at the border without first needing a 
warrant.1 In fiscal year 2015, only about 8,500 electronic devices were 
searched at the border; in fiscal year 2016 that number rose to about 19,000; 
in fiscal year 2017 the number of devices searched increased again to over 
30,000.2 The continued nontrivial increases in the number of electronic 
devices searched at the border, amounting to over 33,000 in fiscal year 2018, 
reveal that border searches of electronic devices are occurring more and 
more frequently with each passing year. The government is able to conduct 
these searches without obtaining warrants because, while the Fourth 
Amendment protects individuals’ “persons, houses, papers, and effects” 
from unreasonable searches and seizures,3 searches at the border have been 
exempt from Fourth Amendment protection. This exception is known 
doctrinally as the border search exception.4 The border search exception 
originally was designed to allow border agents to search travelers’ luggage 
for contraband and other harmful materials.5 However, with the progress of 
technology, the border search exception is now being exploited by border 
agents to conduct forensic searches of travelers’ electronic devices.6 
Forensic searches are essentially “computer strip search[es],”7 wherein the 
government uses forensic software to access all active or readable files on 
the device, as well as password-protected data, hidden or encrypted data, 
 
1. Joint Statement of Stipulated Facts, Ex. 46 ¶ 13, Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC 
(D. Mass. Apr. 30, 2019). The stipulations in the Alasaad case lists the number of border searches of 
electronic devices for the past seven years, with 33,295 devices searched in fiscal year 2018 marking a 
sizable increase from the 30,524 in fiscal year 2017. Id. A press release from the CBP reported a lower 
number of 30,200 border searches of electronic devices for fiscal year 2017. Press Release, U.S. Customs 
& Border Prot., CBP Releases Updated Border Search of Electronic Device Directive and FY17 
Statistics (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-releases-updated-
border-search-electronic-device-directive-and [https://perma.cc/3HS9-SUSJ]. 
2. Kaveh Waddell, The Steady Rise of Digital Border Searches, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2017), ht 
tps://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/04/the-steady-rise-of-digital-border-searches/5227 
23/ [https://perma.cc/W9VC-67F8]. 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).  
4. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 621 (1977) (“[T]he ‘border search’ exception . . . . 
is a longstanding, historically recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s general principle that a 
warrant be obtained . . . .”). 
5. Id. at 618. 
6. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
7. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 966 (9th Cir. 2013). 











deleted files, metadata, and unallocated file space.8 The smartphones, 
laptops, and tablets which accompany travelers to the border provide border 
agents unfettered access to vast quantities of personal information, without 
the protection of the Fourth Amendment.9  
The Supreme Court has not ruled on how to treat forensic searches of 
electronic devices at the border, leaving circuit courts to grapple with the 
question.10 The Eleventh Circuit held that the border search exception 
squarely applies to electronic devices, awarding no more privacy 
protections to smartphones or laptops than is given to suitcases and 
backpacks at the border.11 The Fourth and Ninth Circuits held that the 
privacy interests implicated in electronic devices outweigh the 
governmental interests in border security, therefore border agents must 
possess “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity before conducting a 
forensic search of an electronic device.12 No circuit court has held that 
border agents need a warrant to forensically search an electronic device. The 
splintering among circuits is caused by the collision of two important policy 
interests, privacy rights and border security, leaving the law in chaos.13 
While the Supreme Court has not weighed in on the treatment of 
electronic devices at the border, in recent cases that did not take place at the 
border, the Supreme Court has carved out protections in Fourth Amendment 
doctrine for searches of digital data. These cases offer guidance as to how 
the privacy interests in digital data and electronic devices should be 
understood when balanced against the governmental interests at the 
border.14 
This Note first provides background on the Fourth Amendment and the 
border search exception. Second, this Note discusses the landmark cases 
 
8. See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FORENSIC EXAMINATION OF DIGITAL 
EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 16 (2004) [hereinafter NIJ FORENSIC EXAMINATION 
GUIDE], https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/199408.pdf [https://perma.cc/25YF-C47P]. 
9. Id.  
10. The Eleventh Circuit and the Fourth and Ninth Circuits are split as to how forensic searches 
of electronic devices should be treated at the border. Compare United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 
1229 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that the border search exception applies to electronic devices just as it 
would to other property brought to the border), with United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 144 (4th Cir. 
2018) (holding that electronic devices are categorically different from other objects and therefore the 
border search exception should be narrowed to require some level of reasonable or individualized 
suspicion to forensically search them at the border), and Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 968 (holding the same).  
11. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1229. 
12. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 144; Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 968. 
13. See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1229; Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 144; Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 968. 
14. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) (holding that a warrant is required to search 
a cell phone even if the phone is seized incident to an arrest, thereby deviating from the established 
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement); see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
2206, 2222 (2018) (holding that a warrant is required to search the record a cell phone creates of its 
user’s movements, even though the user’s location information was shared with a third party, thereby 












Riley v. California and Carpenter v. United States to demonstrate how the 
Supreme Court has addressed digital data in the Fourth Amendment context. 
Third, this Note examines the circuit split between the Eleventh Circuit and 
the Fourth and Ninth Circuits regarding how electronic devices have been 
treated at the border. This Note then assesses the arguments for and against 
warrantless forensic searches of electronic devices at the border, and 
resolves the legal conflict in favor of greater privacy protections in 
electronic devices at the border. 
Because searches of electronic devices implicate serious privacy 
interests, because travelers cannot mitigate the risk to their privacy at the 
border, and because a higher standard does not significantly hinder the 
governmental interests present at the border, border agents should be 
required to obtain a warrant before searching electronic devices. Short of a 
warrant, border agents, at a minimum, should be required to possess 
reasonable suspicion before searching electronic devices. 
I. THE BORDER SEARCH EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The Fourth Amendment protects “persons, houses, papers, and effects” 
from unreasonable searches and seizures.15 To conduct a search or seizure 
within the scope of Fourth Amendment protection, the government must 
first show probable cause and obtain a warrant.16 The purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment “is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against 
arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”17 
At the same time, the Supreme Court has recognized a longstanding 
exception to the Fourth Amendment for searches conducted at the border.18 
The border search exception originates from the “longstanding right of the 
sovereign to protect itself” from harm caused by people and property 
crossing the border.19 The exception stems from the governmental interest 
in preventing “unwanted persons and effects,”20 including contraband, 
communicable disease, narcotics, explosives, and other threats to national 
security, from crossing the border.21 Nevertheless, even at the border, courts 
have rejected an “anything goes” approach.22 The Supreme Court has 
distinguished between two types of searches—routine and nonroutine—
 
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
16. Id. 
17. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cty. of S.F., 387 
U.S. 523, 528 (1967)). 
18. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 621 (1977).  
19. Id. at 616.  
20. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004). 
21. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537–39, 544 (1985). 
22. United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2008). 











which places limits on border agents’ ability to conduct searches in certain 
circumstances.23  
For routine searches at the border, border agents do not need any reason 
to search persons and property entering or exiting the country.24 Routine 
searches at the border are considered per se reasonable.25 The governmental 
interests at the border, such as national security and the sovereign’s interest 
in preventing contraband from entering the country, make routine searches 
reasonable by virtue of being at the border.26 Examples of routine searches 
include straightforward searches such as looking in “suitcases, wallets, 
purses, or overcoats,”27 as well as more involved searches such as 
disassembling a vehicle’s gas tank,28 pat down searches,29 close-up sniffing 
by a trained narcotics-detection dog,30 x-raying and drilling holes in 
luggage,31 looking through photo albums or video tapes,32 and even manual 
(non-forensic) reviews of cell phone or computer contents.33 
In contrast to routine searches, nonroutine searches require that border 
agents meet a higher standard of reasonableness, thereby narrowing the 
border search exception.34 Nonroutine border searches are only reasonable 
if they are based on “reasonable suspicion.”35 The Supreme Court has 
identified three types of nonroutine searches: “highly intrusive searches of 
the person,” destructive searches of property, and searches conducted in a 
“particularly offensive” or overly intrusive manner.36 In practice, 
nonroutine searches consist of searches such as “strip searches, body cavity 
searches, searches that destroy property, and prolonged detentions of 
 
23. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 & n.4. 
24. Id. at 538. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 537–38; see also United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (“That searches 
made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and 
examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact 
that they occur at the border, should, by now, require no extended demonstration.”). 
27. Jared Janes, The Border Search Doctrine in the Digital Age: Implications of Riley v. 
California on Border Law Enforcement’s Authority for Warrantless Searches of Electronic Devices, 35 
REV. LITIG. 71, 75–78 (2016). 
28. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155–56 (2004). 
29. United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1999). 
30. United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 2002). 
31. United States v. Lawson, 461 F.3d 697, 701 (6th Cir. 2006). 
32. United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 549 (D. Md. 2014) (citing United States v. 
Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 502–03 (4th Cir. 2005)). 
33. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 729 F.3d 517, 521, 525 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding a “non-
forensic examination” of a computer involving scrolling through images was a “routine border search”); 
United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a search by a border agent 
which involved turning on a laptop and viewing files was reasonable per se). 
34. Janes, supra note 27, at 76–77. 
35. Id. at 77. 












individuals.”37 It is within the third category, overly intrusive searches, that 
some courts have found forensic searches of electronic devices to be 
nonroutine.38  
The Supreme Court defines reasonable suspicion as “a particularized and 
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal 
activity” determined in light of the “totality of the circumstances.”39 The 
law measures intrusiveness by how deeply a search implicates a person’s 
privacy and dignity interests.40 Yet, the Supreme Court has not articulated a 
clear test for what makes a border search reasonable or unreasonable, and 
instead employs a case-by-case analysis.41 Nevertheless, the fact that the 
Supreme Court acknowledges that certain searches at the border require an 
objective basis of reasonableness demonstrates that the law could develop 
to pay heed to the privacy interests of the digital age.  
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S TREATMENT OF SEARCHES INVOLVING 
DIGITAL DATA  
In cases away from the border, the Supreme Court has confronted how 
searching electronic devices maps onto existing Fourth Amendment 
doctrine. Understanding how the Supreme Court treats searches of 
electronic devices away from the border provides guidance as to how they 
should be treated at the border.  
A. Riley v. California  
The landmark case Riley v. California significantly influenced the 
treatment of cell phones and electronic devices in Fourth Amendment 
doctrine.42 Riley involved a warrantless search of data stored on a cell phone 
when the phone was found on the defendant at the time of arrest.43 The lower 
court held that searching the defendant’s phone without a warrant was 
reasonable because it was a search incident to an arrest, which places the 
 
37. Janes, supra note 27, at 77; see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 
541 (1985) (holding a nonroutine border search is justified if border agents have reasonable suspicion 
that the traveler was engaged in smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal).  
38. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 144–46 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. 
Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 963, 967–68 (9th Cir. 2013). 
39. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981). 
40. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 138. 
41. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 963.  
42. See generally Janes, supra note 27 (discussing the impact of Riley on Fourth Amendment 
Doctrine in the border context); Eunice Park, The Elephant in the Room: What Is a “Nonroutine” Border 
Search, Anyway? Digital Device Searches Post-Riley, 44 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 277 (2017) (same); 
Thomas Mann Miller, Comment, Digital Border Searches After Riley v. California, 90 WASH. L. REV. 
1943 (2015) (same). 
43. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 378 (2014). 











search within the purview of the incident to arrest exception to the Fourth 
Amendment.44 The policy reason for this exception stems from the 
governmental interests in protecting officers’ safety (in case the individual 
arrested has weapons on his person) and in preventing the destruction of 
evidence (in case the arrested individual tries to destroy evidence on his 
person).45  
However, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that a 
warrantless search of a cell phone searched incident to an arrest is 
unconstitutional because the policy reasons which gave rise to the incident 
to arrest exception are not present when the search is of a cell phone or 
consists of digital data.46  
Furthermore, the Court articulated that searching cell phones is 
categorically different in both “a quantitative and a qualitative sense”47 from 
more traditional searches. Cell phones are quantitatively different because 
they allow large quantities of personal information to be held “literally in 
the hands of individuals.”48 The immense storage capacity of cell phones 
exposes vast amounts of private information if searched, whereas more 
traditional objects would implicate a lesser amount of private information.49  
Additionally, cell phones are qualitatively different because of the 
sensitive nature of the information they hold and the universality of cell 
phone use.50 “Prior to the digital age, people did not typically carry a cache 
of sensitive personal information with them as they went about their day.”51 
Cell phones collect various types of information like addresses, 
prescriptions, bank statements, and videos.52 Information on cell phones can 
be used to reconstruct a person’s private life and serve as a record dating 
back to the purchase of the cell phone, or earlier, that can be searched and 
sifted through; information contained in traditional objects found on a 
 
44. Id. at 380. 
45. Id. at 384–85 (“[C]oncerns for officer safety and evidence preservation underlie the search 
incident to arrest exception.”); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (“The [incident to 
arrest] exception derives from interests in officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically 
implicated in arrest situations.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 228–29 (1973) (noting the 
policy justifications for the incident to arrest exception include concern for officer safety and evidence 
preservation).  
46. Riley, 573 U.S. at 386 (“Robinson concluded that the two risks . . . —harm to officers and 
destruction of evidence—are present in all custodial arrests. There are no comparable risks when the 
search is of digital data. . . . We therefore decline to extend Robinson to searches of data on cell phones, 
and hold instead that officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting such a search.”). 
47. Id. at 393. 
48. Id. at 386. 
49. Id. at 394. 
50. Id. at 395–96. 
51. Id. at 395. 
52. Id. at 394 (“[A] cell phone collects in one place many distinct types of information—an 
address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video—that reveal much more in combination than 












person would not be nearly as exhaustive.53 Due to the unique nature of cell 
phones and digital data, the Supreme Court held that the incident to arrest 
exception to the Fourth Amendment does not apply to cell phones, and 
therefore a warrant is required.54 
B. Carpenter v. United States 
The Supreme Court did not end its discussion of digital data searches 
with Riley. In the 2018 case Carpenter v. United States,55 the Court 
confronted whether the government could conduct a warrantless search of 
cell phone records to track an individual’s movements.56 The government 
accessed data showing the defendant’s movements by searching his cell 
phone company’s cell-site location information (“CSLI”) records.57  
The government argued that because the CSLI was collected by the cell 
phone company, the defendant did not have an expectation of privacy in that 
information and therefore a search of that information did not violate the 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.58 The government based their 
argument on the third-party doctrine, which states that a person does not 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in information knowingly shared 
or voluntarily conveyed with another, and therefore the individual cannot 
assert a Fourth Amendment violation against the government.59  
The Court in Carpenter rejected the government’s arguments,60 holding 
that an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record 
of his physical movements, as captured through his cell phone and recorded 
by his cell phone company.61 The Court in Carpenter grounded its analysis 
in whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
phone.62 The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test was first introduced 
in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States.63 The majority in 
Katz established that the Fourth Amendment applies to “people, not 
places.”64 The test Justice Harlan proposed, which was later adopted by the 
Court,65 is as follows: where an individual (i) holds a subjective expectation 
of privacy, and (ii) that expectation is objectively reasonable, the protections 
 
53. Id. at 394–95. 
54. Id. at 403. 
55. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
56. Id. at 2211.  
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 2219. 
59. Id.  
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 2219–20.  
62. Id. at 2217–19. 
63. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
64. Id. at 351 (majority opinion). 
65. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). 











of the Fourth Amendment apply.66 Put another way, where individuals and 
society expect privacy, searches within those spheres require a warrant.67 
In Carpenter, the Court applied Justice Harlan’s test to analyze how the 
Fourth Amendment should treat location data recorded by cell phones.68 
Though much cell phone data is shared with cell phone companies, which, 
according to the third-party doctrine, implies the information is not regarded 
as private,69 the Court held that CSLI “is not truly ‘shared’ as one normally 
understands the term.”70 The Court explained that smart phones are 
pervasive and omnipresent71 and that they carry significantly more 
information than traditional data composites like phone logs.72 Additionally, 
the Court articulated that there is no practical way for the individual to 
prevent the collection of his location data by cell phone companies.73  
The Court’s pragmatic analysis in Carpenter indicates the Court’s 
readiness to address the unique challenges electronic devices present to 
existing Fourth Amendment doctrine. Further demonstrating this point, the 
Court cited Justice Brandeis’s “famous dissent” in Olmstead v. United 
States: “[T]he Court is obligated . . . to ensure that the ‘progress of science’ 
does not erode Fourth Amendment protections.”74 Together Riley and 
Carpenter set forth a strong defense for the protection of digital data from 
warrantless searches.75 Given the Court’s recognition of the privacy rights 
associated with electronic devices in Riley and Carpenter, and its 
consciousness of the implications technological advancements have to the 
preservation of Fourth Amendment protections in the digital age, important 
questions arise regarding how electronic devices ought to be treated at the 
border. 
 
66. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
67. See id. at 360–61. 
68. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018). 
69. Id.; see supra note 59 and accompanying text.  
70. Id. at 2220. 
71. See id. at 2218 (“While individuals regularly leave their vehicles, they compulsively carry 
cell phones with them all the time. A cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares 
and into private residences, doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing 
locales.”).  
72. Id. at 2219 (“There is a world of difference between the limited types of personal information 
addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected 
by wireless carriers today.”). 
73. Id. at 2220 (“Apart from disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid 
leaving behind a trail of location data.”). 














IV. SPLINTERING AMONG THE CIRCUITS  
Reasonableness is at the core of how the border search exception should 
apply to electronic devices.76 Recall that routine searches have been deemed 
reasonable per se because they occur at the border, whereas nonroutine 
searches must be justified by reasonable suspicion due to their high 
intrusiveness.77 Electronic devices present challenges to privacy interests 
that traditional objects brought to the border do not, and so the question 
remains: Do forensic searches of electronic devices constitute nonroutine 
searches, and if so, what standard should border agents satisfy for a search 
of an electronic device to be considered reasonable? 
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Cotterman78 and the Fourth Circuit 
in United States v. Kolsuz79 held that forensic searches of electronic devices 
at the border are nonroutine searches and therefore require border agents to 
possess some level of suspicion before forensically searching electronic 
devices.80 In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Touset81 held 
that the border search exception applies normally to electronic devices and 
that no level of suspicion is required for forensic searches of electronic 
devices.82 The analyses in Touset, Kolsuz, and Cotterman rest on three 
prominent factors: the intrusiveness of searching electronic devices, the 
ability of the traveler to mitigate the risk to his privacy interests, and how 
to balance the governmental interests at play.83  
 
76. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381–82 (2014) (“[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). 
77. Janes, supra note 27, at 76–77. 
78. 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013). 
79. 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018). 
80. See id. at 144 (holding that a forensic border search of the defendant’s phone required a 
showing of “individualized suspicion”); see also Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 968 (holding that a forensic 
border search examination of the defendant’s computer required a showing of “reasonable suspicion”). 
Both the Fourth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit holdings only apply to forensic searches. Neither court 
extended their holding to manual, or cursory, searches. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 140 & n.2 (noting that the 
district court found a manual search to be a routine search, and therefore was reasonable per se, and that 
on appeal, Kolsuz expressly disclaimed any challenge to the manual search of his phone); Cotterman, 
709 F.3d at 967 (stating that only a forensic search of an electronic device, not a manual review of its 
files, requires reasonable suslpicion). 
81. 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018). 
82. Id. at 1233 (holding that no suspicion is required for forensic searches of electronic devices 
at the border). 
83. See id. at 1233–35; Koluz, 890 F.3d at 142–46; Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 962–67. 











A. Intrusiveness of Searching Electronic Devices 
i. Eleventh Circuit: Electronic Searches Are Not Intrusive Enough to 
Constitute a Nonroutine Search 
Touset and Judge Smith’s dissent in Cotterman held that the nature of 
the intrusiveness involved in searching electronic devices does not rise to 
the level of intrusiveness found in nonroutine searches.84 Touset and Judge 
Smith distinguish searches of electronic devices from nonroutine searches 
by differentiating between searches of the person and searches of property.85 
Searches that have been considered nonroutine have concerned highly 
intrusive searches of the person, such as strip searches or x-ray 
examinations.86 In contrast, various border search cases held reasonable 
suspicion was not required to search certain property, even when that 
property would ordinarily be considered private.87 For example, United 
States v. Alfaro-Moncada held that a search of a crew member’s living 
quarters on a cargo vessel at the border did not require reasonable 
suspicion,88 and United States v. Flores-Montano held that border agents 
can remove and search a car’s fuel tank without a requirement of reasonable 
suspicion.89 The Touset court noted that these two cases involved property 
that would ordinarily be considered intrusive to search, and yet they did not 
meet the level of intrusiveness which requires individualized suspicion.90 
Consequently, the Touset court said that even though searches of electronic 
devices may be intrusive, because they are searches of property and not 
searches of the person, they do not rise to the level of nonroutine searches.91  
Similarly, Judge Smith in his dissent in Cotterman likened searches of 
electronic devices to established routine searches at the border.92 Judge 
Smith stated that reasonable suspicion is not required for border searches of 
papers, nor “their modern-day equivalent”—i.e. the files stored on 
electronic devices.93 Like the court in Touset, Judge Smith concluded that 
 
84. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233; Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 982 (Smith, J., dissenting).  
85. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233–34; Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 982 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
86. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985) (holding that 
reasonable suspicion was required for the prolonged detention of a person at the border suspected of 
smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal); see also United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 
729 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that reasonable suspicion is required for highly intrusive searches of the 
person like a strip search or an x-ray examination at the border). 
87. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233. 
88. 607 F.3d at 732. 
89. 541 U.S. 149, 155 (2004). 
90. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233. 
91. Id. 
92. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 982–83 (9th Cir. 2013) (Smith, J., dissenting).  












reasonable suspicion is not required for border searches of property, 
including searches of electronic devices.94  
ii. Fourth and Ninth Circuits: Electronic Searches Are So Intrusive as 
to Require Reasonable Suspicion  
In contrast to Touset, the courts in Cotterman and Kolsuz did not restrict 
intrusive nonroutine searches solely to searches of the person.95 Instead, the 
courts in Cotterman and Kolsuz based their holdings on the difference 
between electronic devices and traditional items found in luggage, holding 
that the private nature of the data stored on electronic devices makes 
forensically searching them so intrusive as to require reasonable suspicion.96  
While Cotterman predated Riley and Carpenter, it cited similar concerns 
to those voiced in Riley and Carpenter about the comprehensive and 
sensitive nature of the information stored on electronic devices.97 The court 
in Cotterman distinguished electronic devices from traditional luggage. 
Electronic devices contain “private and sensitive information”98 that 
travelors do not intentionally pack.99 In contrast, a travelor would need to 
make a conscious decision to pack more traditional objects, such as diaries 
or physical copies of bank statements, recognizing that the discrete sensitive 
information they contain would be accessible to border agents if carried to 
the border.100  
Kolsuz, like Cotterman, held that searches of electronic devices at the 
border require reasonable suspicion.101 Because Kolsuz followed Riley,102 
Kolsuz framed its analysis of border searches of electronic devices using 
Riley’s characterization of cell phones as quantitatively and qualitatively 
 
94. Id. at 994.  
95. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 146 (4th Cir. 2018); Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 968. 
96. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 146 (holding that a forensic border search of a phone is nonroutine, and 
requires individualized suspicion); Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 968 (holding that a forensic border search of 
a computer required a showing of reasonable suspicion). 
97. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 965. 
98. Id. at 956. 
99. Id. at 965 (“When carrying a laptop, tablet or other device . . . removing files unnecessary to 
an impending trip is an impractical solution given the volume and often intermingled nature of the files. 
It is also a time-consuming task that may not even effectively erase the files.”). 
100. Id. (“When packing traditional luggage, one is accustomed to deciding what papers to take 
and what to leave behind.”). 
101. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 146. 
102. Note, Kolsuz did not follow Carpenter—Kolsuz (decided May 2018) was decided a month 
before Carpenter (decided June 2018). 











unique.103 Kolsuz found the degree of information stored on a cell phone104 
and the highly sensitive nature of some of that information105 demonstrated 
that forensic searches of cell phones are intrusive in a way which searches 
of other traditional objects are not. Therefore, the intrusiveness of 
forensically searching electronic devices requires border agents to possess 
some level of suspicion before conducting such a search.106  
iii. Intrusiveness Analysis Post-Carpenter 
Recall that Carpenter found that an individual has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured 
through his cell phone.107 The Court grounded its opinion in the constant 
usage of cell phones—which “faithfully follow[] [their] owner beyond 
public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices, political 
headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales”108—and the immense 
amount of information which cell phones store and collect, including 
“exhaustive chronicle[s] of location information.”109 Carpenter’s 
characterization of digital data110 reasserts the Supreme Court’s position 
from Riley that governmental access to vast amounts of an individual’s 
digital data significantly threatens the privacy interests protected by the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Riley and Carpenter unequivocally dispensed with the idea that 
electronic devices and digital data should be treated identically to other 
traditional objects in Fourth Amendment doctrine.111 Both Riley and 
Carpenter declared that longstanding exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement do not apply squarely to searches 
involving digital data.112 As such, Touset’s conclusory argument that 
electronic devices should receive the same treatment as other traditional 
objects at the border fails to adequately account for the Supreme Court’s 
earlier holding in Riley that searches of digital data implicate different 
 
103. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 144 (“[I]n light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley, a forensic 
border search of a phone must be treated as nonroutine, permissible only on a showing of individualized 
suspicion.”). 
104. Id. at 145 (“The sheer quantity of data stored on smartphones and other digital devices dwarfs 
the amount of personal information that can be carried over a border . . . in luggage or a car.”). 
105. Id. (stating that smartphones and laptops contain highly personal and sensitive information 
including financial records, business records, medical records, and personal emails). 
106. Id. at 146.  
107. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–18 (2018). 
108. Id. at 2218. 
109. Id. at 2219. 
110. Id. 
111. See supra Part II.  
112. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20 (third-party doctrine); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 












privacy interests than searches of traditional objects.113 Kolsuz and 
Cotterman anticipated Carpenter’s holding that individuals have significant 
privacy interests in their digital data.114 The courts in Kolsuz and Cotterman 
thereby appropriately concluded that the forensic searches of electronic 
devices at the border are only reasonable if justified by reasonable 
suspicion.115  
iv. Intrusiveness Analysis Empirically  
The conclusion of Kolsuz and Cotterman is reinforced by empirical data 
which reveals the significant expectations of privacy people attribute to their 
electronic devices.116 A study asked three hundred adults living in the 
United States to rate the intrusiveness of different types of searches that 
could occur at the border.117 The results showed that more than 85 percent 
of participants expected content-related searches of their electronic devices 
to require at least reasonable suspicion.118 For specifically forensic searches 
of electronic devices, a mere 8 percent of participants did not expect border 
agents to have to satisfy any standard before conducting the search.119 
Furthermore, the study indicated that people held different expectations 
when it comes to searches of electronic devices as opposed to more 
traditional searches. For more traditional searches, such as conducting pat-
downs, using drug-sniffing dogs, or opening luggage, the participants did 
not believe any level of suspicion was required.120 However, the study found 
that the participants perceived searches of electronic devices to be among 
the most intrusive and the most revealing of sensitive information.121 
Therefore it follows that “[i]f body cavity and strip searches at the border 
 
113. See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2018). 
114. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
115. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 144 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Cotterman, 
709 F.3d 952, 968 (9th Cir. 2013). 
116. Matthew B. Kugler, The Perceived Intrusiveness of Searching Electronic Devices at the 
Border: An Empirical Study, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1165, 1166–67 (2014). 
117. Id. at 1191.  
118. The study measured a variety of content-related searches of electronic devices, such as 
searching a device’s deleted files, e-mails, text messages, recent web searches, and recent calls. For all 
the types of content-related searches measured, more than 85 percent of participants expected border 
agents to be required to satisfy reasonable suspicion or obtain a warrant, before conducting the search. 
Id. at 1196–98. Regarding expectations about if a warrant is needed for searches, the study found only 
one content-related search where a majority of participants believed the search did not require a warrant 
from a judge. “For that single exception—a search of the recent call list—49.47 percent of participants 
still believed that a warrant was required.” Id. at 1195–96. 
119. Of the remaining 92 percent of participants, 78 percent expected that a warrant was required 
for forensic searches of electronic devices at the border. Id. at 1198. 
120. Id. at 1196. 
121. The most intrusive being strip searches and cavity searches. Id.   











require reasonable suspicion because of the privacy and dignity concerns 
that they raise, so too should searches of electronic devices.”122  
While travelers’ overall expectation of privacy over their belongings 
may be less at the border,123 travelers nevertheless retain a strong 
expectation of privacy in their electronic devices at the border.124 The 
study’s empirical evidence, as well as the legal authority of the Supreme 
Court’s opinions in Carpenter and Riley, bolster the conclusions of Kolsuz 
and Cotterman that searching electronic devices at the border should require 
at least a showing of reasonable suspicion. 
B. Travelers’ Ability to Mitigate the Intrusion   
The second factor discussed by cases addressing border searches of 
electronic devices is the traveler’s ability to mitigate the degree of intrusion 
into their privacy from their electronic devices.125 Ultimately, while 
individuals can take precautions to protect their privacy, such as encrypting 
their files or traveling with a device other than their primary personal device, 
the only certain way to protect against forensic searches of electronic 
devices at the border is to leave their devices at home entirely—a solution 
which is impractical in the modern age.126 
i. Just Leave It at Home 
Touset stated that “the Fourth Amendment does not guarantee the right 
to travel without great inconvenience.”127 When traveling to the border, 
travelers are on notice that their belongings may be searched, “and they are 
free to leave any property they do not want searched . . . at home.”128 
Because travelers have the option to travel without their electronic devices 
if they want to prevent the government from accessing their private data, 
they have the ability to mitigate the intrusion into their privacy.129 If their 
electronic devices are simply not brought to the border, border agents cannot 
search them.  
 
122. Id. at 1209. 
123. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 (2004) (“[O]n many occasions, we have 
noted that the expectation of privacy is less at the border than it is in the interior.”). But see Riley v. 
California, 573 U.S. 373, 392 (2014) (“[D]iminished privacy interests do[] not mean that the Fourth 
Amendment falls out of the picture entirely.”). 
124. See generally Kugler, supra note 116 (discussing empirical data on travelers’ expectations 
of privacy in their electronic devices at the border). 
125. See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Kolsuz, 
890 F.3d 133, 145 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 956, 966 (9th Cir. 2013). 
126. See discussion infra Parts III.B.ii, III.B.iii. 
127. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1235. 
128. Id.   












ii. Leaving It at Home Is Impractial  
The court’s position in Touset is persuasive for traditional objects that 
travelers may decide to leave at home, such as diaries or bank statements, 
but the “just leave it at home” argument does not carry much weight with 
regard to electronic devices.130 The court in Kolsuz held that, realistically 
speaking, it is unreasonable to expect travelers to travel without their 
electronic devices.131 The beginning of the Cotterman opinion conveyed a 
similar sentiment, discussing the pervasiveness of electronic devices and the 
frequency with which they accompany travelers to the border, though it did 
not explicitly articulate the same analysis found in Kolsuz.132  
The ubiquity of electronic devices discussed by Cotterman and Kolsuz 
echoes the language used by the Supreme Court in Riley133 and 
Carpenter.134 In those cases, the Court acknowledged that electronic devices 
like cell phones are not likely to be left behind.135 As a Maryland district 
court described, mobile devices serve “as digital umbilical cords to what 
travelers leave behind at home or at work, indispensable travel accessories 
in their own right, and safety nets to protect against the risks of traveling 
abroad.”136 Consequently, it is unlikely that individuals possess any real 
choice to leave their electronic devices behind in order to mitigate the 
intrusion into their devices at the border.  
The ubiquity and constancy of cell phones, and the impracticality of 
leaving them at home, is also supported by empirical data. Nearly every 
American adult owns a cell phone of some kind.137 Eighty-one percent of 
Americans own a smartphone.138 Fifty-two percent of Americans own a 
tablet computer.139 A growing number of Americans use smartphones as 
 
130. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 145. 
131. Id. (“[W]hile an international traveler can mitigate the intrusion occasioned by a routine 
luggage search by leaving behind her diaries, photographs, and other especially personal effects, the 
same is not true, at least practically speaking, when it comes to smartphones and digital devices.”). 
132. The start of the Cotterman opinion reads: “Every day more than a million people cross 
American borders . . . . As denizens of a digital world, they carry with them laptop computers, iPhones, 
iPads, iPods, Kindles, Nooks, Surfaces, tablets, Blackberries, cell phones, digital cameras, and more.” 
United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2013). 
133. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395 (2014) (“Now it is the person who is not carrying a 
cell phone, with all that it contains, who is the exception.”).  
134. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (“While individuals regularly leave 
their vehicles, they compulsively carry cell phones with them all the time. A cell phone faithfully follows 
its owner beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices, political 
headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.”). 
135. See Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2218; Riley, 573 U.S. at 395. 
136. United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 557–58 (D. Md. 2014). 
137. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/m 
obile [https://perma.cc/2MM2-6SP7] (noting 96 percent of Americans own a cell phone). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 











their primary means of online access at home and 17 percent of Americans 
use a smartphone as their only access to internet at home.140 As a result, the 
“just leave it at home” argument is not a realistic solution to protecting 
travelers’ privacy.  
iii. Other Available Alternatives 
Amidst the privacy debate on how electronic devices should be treated 
at the border, technology writers have discussed other methods that 
individuals can use to safeguard the data on the electronic devices at the 
border, aside from simply leaving their devices at home.141 Such methods 
include traveling with a “travel device” (a device used only for traveling as 
opposed to a primary personal device),142 backing up your data to the cloud 
and then erasing it from the local device,143 logging out of apps,144 not 
memorizing your passwords,145 and protecting your data via encryption.146 
However, the effectiveness and practicality of these alternatives vary, and 
 
140. Id. 
141. See SOPHIA COPE ET AL., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., DIGITAL PRIVACY AT THE U.S. BORDER: 
PROTECTING THE DATA ON YOUR DEVICES passim (2017), https://www.eff.org/files/2018/01/11/digital-
privacy-border-12-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9JN-RY3X]; Christopher Elliott, How Can You Protect 
Your Right to Digital Privacy at the Border?, WASH. POST (June 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/lifestyle/travel/how-can-you-protect-your-right-to-digital-privacy-at-the-border/2017/06/08/95c2c 
f3e-358f-11e7-b373-418f6849a004_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e70dbd98c637 [https://per 
ma.cc/CN38-UBXF]; Brian X. Chen, Crossing the Border? Here’s How to Safeguard Your Data From 
Searches, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/21/technology/personaltech/ 
crossing-the-border-heres-how-to-safeguard-your-data-from-searches.html [https://perma.cc/MM2F-9 
BV4]. 
142. Chen, supra note 141.  
143. Id. This method mitigates risk to a traveler’s privacy because it is CBP policy not to access 
data stored remotely on the cloud. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-
049A, BORDER SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES 4 (2018) [herineafter CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-
049A] (“Officers may not intentionally use the device to access information that is solely stored 
remotely.”); see also E.D. Cauchi, Border Patrol Says It's Barred from Searching Cloud Data on 
Phones, NBC NEWS (July 12, 2017, 9:53 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/border-patrol-
says-it-s-barred-searching-cloud-data-phones-n782416 [https://perma.cc/PD2J-TU9Z] (“U.S. border 
officers aren't allowed to look at any data stored only in the ‘cloud’—including social media data—when 
they search U.S. travelers' phones, Customs and Border Protection acknowledged in a letter obtained 
Wednesday by NBC News.”). 
144. Chen, supra note 141.  
145. For example, an individual could practice this method by allowing a friend to change the 
password to his device. The individual would recover the password for his device from his friend only 
after he has crossed the border. Id. 
146. Id. “[E]ncryption is the method by which . . . data is converted from a readable form to an 
encoded version that can only be decoded by another entity if they have access to a decryption key.” 
Margaret Rouse et al., Encryption, SEARCHSECURITY (May 2019), https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com 
/definition/encryption [https://perma.cc/454Q-SD5A]. Programs, such as BitLocker, TrueCrypt, or 
Apple’s Fivevault, allow individuals to encrypt data on their electronic devices. See Andy Greenberg, A 














the use of some of these alternatives may be ineffective in the context of 
forensic searches which have the ability, for example, to crack 
encryptions.147 Ultimately, the only sure way to protect your data privacy, 
when the law does not afford protection, is to leave your devices at 
home148—which, as previously stated, is an unrealistic solution.149  
C. Balancing Governmental Interests 
The third major factor which the courts in Touset, Kolsuz, and Cotterman 
discuss is the weight that should be granted to the governmental interests at 
play at the border.150 Exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement arise from instances where governmental interests outweigh 
individual privacy interests.151 For the purposes of weighing privacy 
interests in electronic devices against governmental interests at the border, 
Riley and Carpenter provide guidance as to how strong the privacy interests 
are in electronic devices. In Riley the Court held that individuals’ privacy 
interests in their cell phones outweighed the governmental interests in 
protecting officers’ safety and in preventing the destruction of evidence.152 
In Carpenter the Court held that the privacy interests implicated in the 
“exhaustive chronicle” of location information amassed by cell phone 
companies outweighed the governmental interest in being able to obtain 
information without a warrant when an individual voluntarily shares that 
information with a third party and thus does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy over that information.153 These cases demonstrate 
that the privacy interests in digital data are strong enough to outweigh 
governmental interests in other Fourth Amendment doctrine exceptions, and 
potentially strong enough to outweigh the significant governmental interests 




147. See NIJ FORENSIC EXAMINATION GUIDE, supra note 8, at 16. 
148. Elliott, supra note 141. 
149. See discussion supra Part III.B.ii. 
150. See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Kolsuz, 
890 F.3d 133, 143 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 966 (9th Cir. 2013); see 
also Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 152 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (discussing the severity of the governmental 
interests at the border—“the point most freighted with security threats and the point at which a nation 
asserts and affirms its very right to nationhood”). 
151. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (discussing the third-party 
doctrine); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385–93 (2014) (discussing the search incident to arrest 
exception); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–307 (1999) (discussing the automobile exception 
and its application to containers found within the automobile); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 
473 U.S. 531, 538–41 (1985) (discussing the border search exception). 
152. Riley, 573 U.S. at 403.  
153. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219. 











i. Governmental Interests at the Border 
The origin of the border search exception was to allow the government 
to protect the country against “unwanted persons and effects,”154 such as 
contraband, communicable disease, narcotics, explosives, and other threats 
to national security.155 To justify applying the border search exception to 
forensic searches of electronic devices, the significant privacy interests 
implicated in suspicionless forensic searches must be outweighed by the 
governmental interests present at the border.  
a. National Security Concerns Are Paramount  
The governmental interests in searching electronic devices at the border 
involve national security interests, such as guarding against terrorism.156 
When balancing the interests of the government against the individual’s 
right to privacy at the border, the balance is “struck much more favorably 
to the Government,” due to the weighty interest the nation has in protecting 
itself from threats to its security.157 Moreover, the CBP considers searches 
of electronic devices to be “essential to . . . detect evidence relating to 
terrorism and other national security matters.”158 Suspicionless forensic 
searches allow border agents broad discretion to act based on their 
professional experience without requiring them to delineate a justification 
for each search.159 The broad discretion given to border agents to conduct 
suspicionless forensic searches creates a “powerful deterrent” for 
“technologically savvy terrorists and criminals.”160  
Touset held that the governmental interests present at the border 
outweighed the privacy interest travelers have in their electronic devices,161 
 
154. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) (“The Government’s interest in 
preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border.”). 
155. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 544. 
156. CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, supra note 143, at 4. Governmental interests at the border 
include detecting and interdicting terrorists, drug smugglers, and human traffickers; preventing against 
the entry of dangerous goods, terrorist weapons, and contraband; and enforcing immigration laws. Id. 
(citing 6 U.S.C. § 211 (2012)); see also United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 985 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(Smith, J., dissenting) (“Terrorists rely on electronic storage devices, for example, to copy and alter 
passports and other travel documents.”). 
157. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540. Also recall that the expectation of privacy is less at 
the border. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154. But see Riley, 573 U.S. at 392 (“[D]iminished privacy 
interests do[] not mean that the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture entirely.”). 
158. CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, supra note 143, at 1. 
159. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 984 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
160. Id. at 985. 
161. The court stated, “We are . . . unpersuaded that a traveler’s privacy interest should be given 
greater weight than the ‘paramount interest [of the sovereign] in protecting . . . its territorial integrity.’” 
United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Flores-












stating that the government needs the ability to search electronic devices at 
the border to protect its border from the new threats to national security 
posed by technologically sophisticated criminals.162 Touset reasoned that, in 
fact, the technological advancements in electronic devices and danger of 
technologically savvy criminals necessitate a lenient approach to searching 
electronic devices at the border.163 
Additionally, Judge Smith’s dissent in Cotterman weighed national 
security similarly to the Touset majority.164 Judge Smith’s dissent raised 
concerns about practical and administrative limits on the ability of border 
search agents to search electronic devices.165 Judge Smith stated that it 
would be administratively impractical to expect border agents to determine 
what constitutes sufficient reasonable suspicion to forensically search an 
electronic device.166 Judge Smith suspected that border agents, confused or 
uncertain about how to comply with a reasonable suspicion standard, would 
be reluctant to conduct a search out of fear of disciplinary hearings or a 
Bivens action,167 thereby leaving the border vulnerable.168 
b. Clarity of the Doctrine Is Valuable  
Furthermore, Judge Smith identified that one advantage to squarely 
applying the border search exception to electronic devices is clarity and 
consistency of the law.169 Departing from longstanding and well-defined 
areas of Fourth Amendment doctrine can cause confusion.170 Applying the 
border search doctrine consistently to all searches of property at the border 
would give border agents surety that they are complying with the Fourth 
 
162. Id. at 1235 (“If anything, the advent of sophisticated technological means for concealing 
contraband only heightens the need of the government to search property at the border unencumbered 
by judicial second-guessing.”). 
163. Id. 
164. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 981 (Smith, J., dissenting) (“I sincerely hope the Supreme Court 
will . . . reverse the holding in this case . . . for the sake of our national security, and the consistency of 
our national border search law.”). 
165. Id. at 984. 
166. Id. at 982. 
167. A Bivens action is a federal cause of action for an individual to recover damages from a 
federal officer who has violated his Fourth Amendment rights. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).  
168. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 986 (Smith, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s reasonable suspicion 
requirement saddles border patrol agents with a ‘Sophie’s choice’ between securing our nation, and 
protecting their own livelihoods. These misaligned incentives create unnecessary risk . . . .”). 
169. Id. at 984. 
170. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2224 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(stating that the majority’s departure from the third-party doctrine with regard to cell-site records 
“unhinges Fourth Amendment doctrine,” “draws an unprincipled and unworkable line” between types 
of records, and will “frustrate principled application of the Fourth Amendment”). 











Amendment, and lower courts clarity as to the contours of the legal 
doctrine.171  
However, refusing to require reasonable suspicion to conduct a forensic 
search of an electronic device at the border solely for the sake of clarity and 
consistency of doctrine alone is not a persuasive argument. Clarity and 
consistency of doctrine come second to preserving individuals’ 
constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment.172 Moreover, the border 
search exception already lacks consistency and clarity—border agents are 
already required to justify certain nonroutine border searches with 
reasonable suspicion.173 Any disruption to the clarity of the border search 
exception doctrine has already been approved by the Supreme Court for 
searches classified as nonroutine. The present legal issue would merely 
require that same standard in another set of border searches: forensic 
searches of electronic devices.174  
ii. Privacy Interests Outweigh the Governmental Interests 
a. The Privacy Interests Implicated Are Serious 
Unlike the court in Touset, the courts in Cotterman and Kolsuz held that 
the balance of the nation’s governmental interests and travelers’ privacy 
interests is best achieved by requiring reasonable suspicion to search 
electronic devices at the border.175 As discussed previously, the privacy 
interests implicated in suspicionless forensic searches of electronic devices 
are significant.176 Furthermore, while the sheer number of travelers affected 
by suspicionless forensic searches of their electronic devices may be small, 
as Cotterman stated, “It is the potential unfettered dragnet effect that is 
 
171. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 985 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
172. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219 (refusing to mechanically apply the third-party doctrine to 
cell-site location information because of the immense privacy interests implicated in digital data); Riley 
v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) (declining to apply the incident to arrest warrant exception to 
searches of cell phones); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001) (rejecting a “mechanical 
interpretation” of the Fourth Amendment and holding that the government could not exploit 
technological advancements in thermal imaging to skirt Fourth Amendment protections); Carpenter, 
138 S. Ct. at 2263–64 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[C]larity alone cannot justify the third party doctrine.”). 
173. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155–56 (2004); United States v. 
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985); see also Janes, supra note 27, at 77 (discussing how 
reasonable suspicion is required to conduct certain nonroutine border searches); Park, supra note 42, at 
282 (discussing how highly intrusive searches at the border require a minimal showing of reasonable 
suspicion). 
174. See generally United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. 
Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018); Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952. 
175. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 144; Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 968. 












troublesome.”177 The mere lack of restrictions on the government to 
forensically search electronic devices at the border leaves travelers 
vulnerable to potential abuses of that power, which, in the context of 
electronic devices, implicate significant privacy interests.  
b. The Reasonable Suspicion Requirement Is Not Overly 
Burdensome  
Requiring border agents to satisfy reasonable suspicion before 
conducting a forensic search of an electronic device would not significantly 
impede the governmental interests underlying the border search exception 
because border agents have already been found to satisfy a reasonable 
suspicion requirement.178 In Cotterman, during the initial security search of 
the defendant at the border, a Treasury Enforcement Communication 
System (“TECS”) alert was triggered, indicating that the defendant had a 
prior conviction for child molestation, had traveled out of the country 
frequently, and was possibly involved in child sex tourism.179 The alert was 
part of “Operation Angel Watch”—a program designed to investigate 
individuals suspected of carrying paraphernalia of child pornography.180 
The court in Cotterman held that the TECS alert for the defendant, the 
defendant’s prior related conviction and frequent travels, the fact that the 
defendant was crossing from a country known for sex tourism, the presence 
of password-protected files on the defendant’s computer, as well as the 
nature of the Operation Angel Watch program, taken together, constituted 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to support a forensic search on his 
electronic devices.181 
In Kolsuz, the defendant was suspected of attempting to export firearm 
parts without a license.182 After admitting he had firearm parts without a 
federal license, the defendant’s smartphone was manually searched by 
border agents—a routine search that is per se reasonable—followed by a 
 
177. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 966. As it is, the number of searches of electronic devices at the 
border has increased significantly over just the past few years: in fiscal year 2015 about 8,500 electronic 
devices were searched; in fiscal year 2016, that number climbed to more than 19,000; in fiscal year 2017 
there were over 30,200; and in fiscal year 2018 a total of 33,295 electronic devices were searched. Joint 
Statement of Stipulated Facts, Ex. 46 ¶ 13, Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-11730-DJC (D. Mass. Apr. 
30, 2019). 
178. See infra notes 185–190 and accompanying text. 
179. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 957. The Department of Homeland Security uses TECS to keep track 
of individuals crossing the border who are suspected of criminal activity. Id. at 957 n.3. 
180. Id. at 958. 
181. Id. at 969. The court made note that a discovery of password-protected files alone would not 
satisfy reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, but it could be considered together with other evidence 
of suspicious activity in the totality of circumstances. Id. 
182. United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 139 (4th Cir. 2018). 











forensic search of the device.183 The court held that the forensic search was 
supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.184 
As Cotterman and Kolsuz show, border agents have successfully 
satisfied the reasonable suspicion requirement without difficulty when 
conducting forensic searches of electronic devices.185 Furthermore, various 
lower courts have also found reasonable suspicion was satisfied in border 
search cases, even if they did not hold that reasonable suspicion was 
necessary to conduct the search.186 Since border agents have satisfied the 
reasonable suspicion standard in the past, without any guidance—from 
courts or otherwise—there is no reason to expect that border agents would 
not be able to continue to do so if this standard becomes mandatory. 
Moreover it is unlikely that the standard of reasonable suspicion will 
impede border agents’ ability to conduct searches.187 Typically border 
agents only conduct forensic searches of electronic devices where 
reasonable suspicion is already present.188 The plain reality of limited 
government resources forces border agents to be discerning when they 
decide to conduct a forensic search, meaning they likely would only expend 
the effort to conduct a forensic search of an electronic device when they 
already possess some suspicion.189 The reasonable suspicion standard still 
leaves border agents with flexibility to employ common sense and rely on 





185. Id.; Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952. Note that Cotterman and Kolsuz limit their holdings to just 
forensic searches of electronic devices. The courts do not extend the reasonable suspicion requirement 
to cursory or “manual” searches of electronic devices. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 141; Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 
967. 
186. Patrick E. Corbett, The Future of the Fourth Amendment in a Digital Evidence Context: 
Where Would the Supreme Court Draw the Electronic Line at the International Border?, 81 MISS. L.J. 
1263, 1306–07 (2012); see, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (finding reasonable 
suspicion present); United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287, 293 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that if 
the border search was nonroutine and required reasonable suspicion, the border agents had requisite 
reasonable suspicion based on finding drugs in the defendant’s luggage); United States v. Irving, 452 
F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding the search was supported by reasonable suspicion); United States 
v. Rogozin, No. 09-CR-379(S)(M), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121162, at *8–9 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2010) 
(finding the search satisfied reasonable suspicion, but not ruling on whether such a search required a 
reasonable suspicion standard); United States v. Verma, No. H-08-699-1, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34559, 
at *12–13 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2010) (finding the evidence supported reasonable suspicion, even though 
no suspicion was required). 
187. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 967. 
188. Id. at 967 n.14 (“As a practical matter, border agents are too busy to do extensive searches 
(removing gas tanks and door panels, boring holes in truck beds) unless they have suspicion.” (quoting 
United States v. Chaudhry, 424 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005) (Fletcher, J., concurring))). 
189. Id. 












IV. RESOLVING THE CHAOS: REQUIRE REASONABLE SUSPICION – BETTER 
YET, GET A WARRANT  
A. At a Minimum, Satisfy Reasonable Suspicion  
Riley and Carpenter demonstrate the significant privacy interests 
implicated in searches of electronic devices.191 In those cases, the Supreme 
Court has carved out privacy protections for digital data, in spite of 
applicable existing Fourth Amendment exceptions.192 At the border, those 
same serious privacy interests are present when individuals travel with their 
electronic devices. The highly intrusive nature of forensically searching 
electronic devices demonstrates that forensic searches of electronic devices 
at the border constitute nonroutine searches, and thereby require a standard 
of reasonable suspicion.193 Furthermore, because traveling without one’s 
electronic devices is impractical, the individual has little ability to 
effectively mitigate the risk to their privacy at the border.194 As such, it is 
imperative that the law creates additional safeguards within the border 
search exception for searches of electronic devices at the border. Requiring 
border agents to satisfy reasonable suspicion before conducting a forensic 
search of an electronic device would protect the serious privacy interests 
implicated in such searches while placing only a slight burden on the 
furtherance of the governmental interests present at the border.195 
B. The Case in Favor of a Warrant 
Even post-Riley, no case has held that more than reasonable suspicion is 
required to conduct a forensic search of an electronic device at the border,196 
and the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Vergara expressly rejected a 
warrant requirement for forensic border searches of cell phones.197 
Nevertheless, privacy advocates like the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
 
191. See discussion supra Part III.A.  
192. See discussion supra Part II.  
193. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
194. See discussion supra Part III.B.ii.  
195. See discussion supra Part III.C.ii. 
196. United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 147 (4th Cir. 2018) (“But there was no case suggesting 
that even more would be necessary—for a forensic search of a phone at the border or, indeed, for any 
border search, no matter how nonroutine or invasive. And that remains the case today: Even as Riley has 
become familiar law, there are no cases requiring more than reasonable suspicion for forensic cell phone 
searches at the border.”).  
197. United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2018). In Vergara, the defendant 
argued that evidence of child pornography obtained from a forensic search of his cell phone should be 
suppressed because the search was conducted without a warrant based on probable cause. The court held 
that forensic searches of cell phones at the border do not require a warrant or probable cause. Id. at 1312–
13. 











(“EFF”)198 and the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”),199 as well as 
Judge Pryor’s dissenting opinion in Vergara,200 have argued in favor of 
requiring border agents to obtain a warrant based on probable cause in order 
to conduct a forensic search of an electronic device at the border.  
Judge Pryor argued that the significant privacy interests implicated in 
electronic devices, balanced against the slight burden of getting a warrant, 
should require border agents to obtain a warrant before conducting a 
forensic search.201 To support her stance, Judge Pryor cited the Supreme 
Court’s characterization of cell phones in Riley, that cell phones are 
qualitatively and quantitatively different from traditional objects due to their 
immense storage capacity and the sensitive nature of the information stored 
on them.202 Judge Pryor stated that “cell phones are fundamentally different 
from any object traditionally subject to government search at the border”203 
and that cell phones do not contain the physical contraband which border 
searches traditionally targeted.204 In addition, Judge Pryor argued that the 
burden of obtaining a warrant is minimal.205 Technological advancements 
have made the process of obtaining a warrant easier and faster.206 Therefore, 
border agents should be required to obtain a warrant to conduct a forensic 
search of a cell phone.  
Additionally, Fourth Amendment protections are not designed for ease 
of compliance or implementation.207 Drawing from the Supreme Court’s 
guidance in Riley,208 weighing the highly intrusive nature of a forensic 
search of electronic devices against the slight burden of obtaining a warrant, 
 
198. See Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. in Support of Defendant-
Appellant at 2, United States v. Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-50070) [hereinafter 
EFF Amicus Brief] (“[B]order agents should be required to obtain a probable cause warrant to search 
the data stored or accessible on a digital device.”). 
199. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union et al. in Support of Defendant-
Appellant at 28, United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-4687) [hereinafter ACLU 
Amicus Brief] (“This Court should hold that because searches of electronic devices seized at the border 
infringe deeply on privacy interests, such searches should only be permitted pursuant to a warrant or, at 
a minimum, probable cause.”).   
200. Vergara, 884 F.3d at 1313–19 (Pryor, J., dissenting) (holding that post-Riley, a forensic 
border search of a cell phone should require a warrant based on probable cause). 
201. Id. at 1317. 
202. Id. at 1318. 
203. Id. at 1315. 
204. Id. at 1317 (such as communicable diseases, narcotics, or explosives); see also EFF Amicus 
Brief, supra note 198, at 3 (“[S]earches of digital devices without a warrant and probable cause are not 
sufficiently ‘tethered’ to the narrow purposes justifying the border search exception: immigration and 
customs enforcement.”). But see United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Border 
agents bear the same responsibility for preventing the importation of contraband in a traveler’s 
possession regardless of advances in technology.”). 
205. Vergara, 884 F.3d at 1317 (Pryor, J., dissenting). 
206. In some jurisdictions, warrant requests can be emailed to judges which can be signed and 
returned in less than fifteen minutes. Id. (citing Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014)). 
207. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 












it is reasonable—and arguably preferable due to the severe implications to 
individuals’ privacy—to require border agents to obtain a warrant before 
conducting a forensic search of an electronic device at the border. To borrow 
the Supreme Court’s language in Riley, the solution is “accordingly 
simple—get a warrant.”209 
V. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
In addition to the topics addressed thus far in this Note, there are three 
additional considerations related to border searches of electronic devices 
which merit discussion. First, the cases at the center of this Note concern 
forensic searches of electronic devices, but should the reasonable suspicion 
standard also apply to manual searches? This question requires analysis of 
the difference between a forensic search and a manual search, and the 
privacy interests implicated in each.  
Second, how do border agents treat travelers’ password-protected 
devices at the border? Specifically, do travelers have to provide border 
agents with their cell phone or laptop passwords if asked, and what data can 
be accessed from password-protected devices if they refuse? 
Third, what is the current status of this legal issue? A recent change to 
CBP policy may remove this legal issue from pressing legal debate, but even 
if the debate is removed from the courts, the pressing policy concerns 
between privacy and governmental interests at the border survive and the 
need to update Fourth Amendment doctrine in the wake of digital data 
remains imperative. 
A. Manual Searches and Forensic Searches Compared 
A forensic search uses forensic software to copy, analyze, and preserve 
data stored on a device.210 This type of search gives the examiner access to 
all readable files, password-protected data, hidden or encrypted data, 
deleted files, metadata, and unallocated file space.211 In contrast to a forensic 
search, a manual search of a cell phone, also referred to as a cursory search, 
accesses a device’s contents “in the same way a typical user would.”212 
None of the cases at the center of this Note held that manual searches are 
 
209. Id. at 403. 
210. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 963 n.9 (9th Cir. 2013). 
211. See NIJ FORENSIC EXAMINATION GUIDE, supra note 8, at 16. 
212. United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 140 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Kolsuz, 
185 F. Supp. 3d 843, 853 (E.D. Va. 2016)). 











nonroutine or that manual searches require reasonable suspicion at the 
border.213  
The degree of information implicated in forensic searches, compared 
with information accessed by manual searches, may explain the courts’ 
different treatment of the two types of searches. As Cotterman stated, “An 
exhaustive forensic search of a copied laptop hard drive intrudes upon 
privacy and dignity interests to a far greater degree than a cursory search at 
the border.”214  
But prominent privacy advocates have argued that manual searches, as 
well as forensic searches, should be treated as nonroutine searches because 
even manual searches grant the government access to large amounts of 
sensitive and private information.215 Manual searches can be highly 
intrusive because they could reveal much of the same sensitive information 
as forensic searches—private messages, emails, call logs, apps, 
photographs, calendars, and more.216 Because many of the privacy interests 
implicated during forensic searches are also present during manual searches, 
manual searches should also require some higher standard of 
reasonableness.217  
 
213. United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding that a border search 
of personal property does not require suspicion, though the court did not directly address the issue of 
manual searches); Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 967 (stating that reasonable suspicion is only required for a 
forensic search and not a manual search); Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 140 (noting that the district court 
acknowledged that the Fourth Circuit has treated a manual or cursory search of a computer at the border 
as routine, but because the defendant did not challenge the manual search evidence on appeal, the court 
did not consider the issue further); see also United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 
2018) (stating that because the evidence leading to the defendant’s conviction only stemmed from the 
forensic search, the court did not consider the level of suspicion required to support the initial, manual 
search of the cell phones).  
214. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 966 (likening a forensic search to a “computer strip search”); see also 
Vergara, 884 F.3d at 1318 (Pryor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he extreme intrusion into privacy posed by a 
forensic cell phone search [is] well beyond the intrusion posed by a manual search . . . .”). 
215. See EFF Amicus Brief, supra note 198, at 19; ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 199, at 13–
14; see also Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 981 (Smith, J., dissenting) (“Why the use of computer software to 
analyze a hard drive triggers a reasonable suspicion requirement while a ‘manual review’ of the same 
hard drive requires no suspicion, is left unexplained.”). 
216. EFF Amicus Brief, supra note 198, at 16 (“‘Manual’ searches of digital data can access 
emails, voicemails, text messages, call logs, contact lists, photographs, videos, calendar entries, 
shopping lists, personal notes, and web browsing history, as well as cloud data via apps.”); ACLU 
Amicus Brief, supra note 199, at 13 (“An agent may be able to click on an email application and read 
thousands of emails stored on remote servers, or do the same with a health application and see years’ 
worth of data about heart rates, reproductive cycles, and more.”); see also United States v. Saboonchi, 
990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 547 (D. Md. 2014) (acknowledging that “a conventional computer search can be 
deeply probing and . . . has the potential to be invasive”). 
217. EFF Amicus Brief, supra note 198, at 19 (“[A]ll searches of digital data at the border are 
‘non-routine’ and thus fall outside the border search exception because the government’s conduct is the 
same: accessing to an unprecedented degree tremendous amounts of highly personal information.”); 
ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 199, at 13–14 (“[A]n officer without specialized training or equipment 
can conduct exhaustive keyword searches using the device’s built-in search function, thereby achieving 












B. The Effectiveness of Passwords 
While a detailed discussion of whether border agents can force travelers 
to provide their passwords is beyond the scope of this Note, the 
effectiveness of passwords as privacy protection merits some discussion. 
The Fifth Amendment privilege protects individuals against self-
incrimination even at the border.218 Revealing a password is considered 
testimonial or communicative evidence which is protected by the Fifth 
Amendment.219 Therefore, forcing the surrender of a password at the border 
could violate the Fifth Amendment.220 However, despite the Fifth 
Amendment protection guaranteed to travelers, border agents possess legal 
ways of pressuring travelers to give up their passwords. Border agents can 
in effect coerce travelers to relinquish their passwords by detaining 
travelers221 or confiscating their devices.222  
The privacy implications of a traveler sharing his password with border 
agents vary depending on the type of search being conducted—forensic or 
manual—as well as the level of security afforded by a device’s password 
protection. To conduct a manual search of a password-protected device—
which the law currently considers a routine search223—border agents would 
need the device’s password to access its contents.224 If a traveler does not 
share his password (and the border agent is unable to guess it), the border 
agent would not be able to access the contents of the device via manual 
search, in which case a password would serve as an effective safeguard to 
 
218. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).  
219. Id. 
220. That being said, in contrast to passwords, some electronic devices unlock via a fingerprint 
sensor, which may not be protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege. Law enforcement agents have 
been able to secure warrants to compel people to unlock their phones by fingerprint because, while a 
password is protected testimony under the Fifth Amendment, a fingerprint is not of a testimonial nature 
and may not receive Fifth Amendment protections. Yet, it is unclear how fingerprint sensors would be 
treated at the border. Due to the lack of clarity, technology writers advise travelers to fully power down 
electronic devices with fingerprint censors because the devices usually require a password or pin, not a 
fingerprint, when they power back up. See Chen, supra note 141.  
221. See Kaveh Waddell, A NASA Engineer Was Required to Unlock His Phone at the Border, 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/02/a-nasa-engineer-i 
s-required-to-unlock-his-phone-at-the-border/516489/ [https://perma.cc/KW84-NPC2]; see also E.D. 
Cauchi, What If U.S. Border Agents Ask for Your Cellphone?, NBC NEWS (Apr. 4, 2017, 11:56 AM), ht 
tps://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/what-if-u-s-border-agents-ask-your-cellphone-n742511 [https:/ 
/perma.cc/TAV7-Z9VF] (“If you refuse a search, they can keep you at the border for hours . . . .”). 
222. CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, supra note 143, at 7 (“An Officer may detain electronic 
devices . . . for a brief, reasonable period of time . . . . Unless extenuating circumstances exist, the 
detention of devices ordinarily should not exceed five (5) days.”). 
223. See supra notes 212–214 and accompanying text.  
224. Punam Singh Rogers & Emily Nash, Border Searches of Your Electronic Devices—What 
Rights Do You Have?, FOLEY HOAG LLP (Mar. 23, 2017), https://foleyhoag.com/publications/alerts-an 
d-updates/2017/march/border-searches-of-your-electronic-devices [https://perma.cc/K5RL-ZB8W] 
(“[I]f you have a password and you do not provide that password to the agent conducting the search, the 
routine search may not be able to proceed any further.”). 











privacy interests despite the absence of a reasonable suspicion standard.225 
If, however, border agents can in essence compel travelers to reveal their 
passwords, any protection passwords offer against a manual search would 
be irrelevant and meaningless.226  
In contrast to a manual search, a forensic search can bypass certain 
password protections and encryptions, thereby nullifying the protections 
passwords provide.227 Depending on the sophistication of a device’s 
encryption, it is conceivable that the encryption cannot be cracked by the 
government’s forensic search.228 However, technology writers caution that 
forensic searches of electronic devices by the government can successfully 
crack most encryptions.229 The lack of protections provided by passwords 
and encryption during forensic searches of electronic devices makes a 
reasonable suspicion requirement all the more important to protect 
travelers’ privacy interests.  
C. Current Status of the Legal Issue 
A recent change to CBP policy may remove this legal issue from pressing 
legal debate. The CBP amended its policy in 2018 to require border agents 
to have reasonable suspicion for an “advanced search”—a search where 
agents use devices or software to conduct a forensic search of a device.230 
This policy alteration may lessen the pressure on the Supreme Court to 
address the legal conflict by rendering the issue nonurgent.  
 
225. Id.  
226. Id.  
227. See NIJ FORENSIC EXAMINATION GUIDE, supra note 8, at 16 (stating that the “logical 
extraction” stage may include extraction of password-protected, encrypted, and compressed data); see 
also Meg Graham, Inside the Software Law Enforcement Uses to Get Into Your Phone, CHI. TRIBUNE 
(Mar. 4, 2016, 5:30 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/originals/ct-software-apple-iphone-
nowsecure-susteen-bsi-20160304-story.html [https://perma.cc/GM4T-8XV5] (“When a phone is locked 
with a passcode, companies can run ‘brute force’ applications to open it.”); Selena Larson, How Cops 
Could Get Your Data Without Unlocking Your Phone, CNN: BUS. (Nov. 10, 2017, 3:34 PM), https://mon 
ey.cnn.com/2017/11/10/technology/apple-texas-shooting-iphone/index.html [https://perma.cc/S354-A 
QD2]. 
228. Dustin Volz, FBI Chief Calls Unbreakable Encryption ‘Urgent Public Safety Issue,’ 
REUTERS (Jan. 9, 2018, 9:13 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-fbi/fbi-chief-calls-unbr 
eakable-encryption-urgent-public-safety-issue-idUSKBN1EY1S7 [https://perma.cc/2964-792P].  
229. See Thomas Brewster, The Feds Can Now (Probably) Unlock Every iPhone Model in 
Existence, FORBES (Feb. 26, 2018, 10:20 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2018/02/2 
6/government-can-access-any-apple-iphone-cellebrite/1 [https://perma.cc/P3MD-SM6G] (discussing 
the vendor Cellebrite, which the U.S. government has used to unlock and extract data from mobile 
devices); see also Joseph Cox, Cops Around the Country Can Now Unlock iPhones, Records Show, 
VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 12, 2018, 4:52 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/vbxxxd/ 
unlock-iphone-ios11-graykey-grayshift-police [https://perma.cc/PS7N-3LCH] (discussing the tool 
GrayKey, which can be used to bypass encryption).  












Yet, the new CBP policy has been criticized by privacy advocates for 
containing a large loophole for the reasonable suspicion requirement for 
advanced searches.231 The policy states that border agents do not need 
reasonable suspicion for such a search when there is a “national security 
concern.”232 Privacy advocates worry that “national security concern” will 
be construed broadly, thereby nullifying any added protection the CBP had 
awarded to privacy interests.233  
Nevertheless, the legal issue of how border searches of electronic devices 
should be treated continues to be grappled with by courts.  Separate from 
the cases which constitute the circuit split discussed in this Note, the EFF 
and ACLU have a pending suit against the Department of Homeland 
Security on behalf of eleven travelers whose electronic devices were 
searched at the border without a warrant.234  The case, Alasaad v. Nielsen, 
was filed in the District Court of Massachusetts and has the potential to be 
later appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals and beyond to the 
Supreme Court. The case will add a new dimension to the law of border 
searches of electronic devices, and if heard by the Supreme Court, could 
resolve the conflict in law.  
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has already confronted the danger posed by the 
digital age to Fourth Amendment privacy protections in Riley and 
Carpenter. In those cases, the Supreme Court held that the significant 
privacy interests in digital data outweighed the governmental interests at 
 
231. See Sophia Cope & Aaron Mackey, New CBP Border Device Search Policy Still Permits 
Unconstitutional Searches, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018 
/01/new-cbp-border-device-search-policy-still-permits-unconstitutional-searches [https://perma.cc/YZ7 
Y-V9L4] (“U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issued a new policy on border searches of 
electronic devices that's full of loopholes and vague language and that continues to allow agents to 
violate travelers’ constitutional rights.”); see also Neema Singh Guliani, Congress Can Stop Humiliating 
and Unconstitutional Device Searches at the Border, ACLU (Jul. 13, 2018, 7:00 PM), https://www.aclu. 
org/blog/privacy-technology/privacy-borders-and-checkpoints/congress-can-stop-humiliating-and [http 
s://perma.cc/VZL3-9FHV] (“CBP updated its guidance . . . but the new rules still have glaring loopholes 
and deficiencies.”). 
232. CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, supra note 143, at 5. 
233. Cope & Mackey, supra note 231.   
234. Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief, Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 1:17-cv-11730-DJC, 
2017 WL 4037436 (D. Mass. Sept. 13, 2017); see also Press Release, Elec. Frontier Found., EFF, ACLU 
Sue Over Warrantless Phone, Laptop Searches at U.S. Border (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.eff.org/pres 
s/releases/eff-aclu-media-conference-call-today-announce-lawsuit-over-warrantless-phone-and [https:// 
perma.cc/R9WA-UFN2]. At the time this Note was published, both parties had filed motions for 
summary judgment, but Judge Casper of the District Court of Massachusetts had not yet ruled on the 
pending motions. 











play, and in so doing, the Supreme Court updated the Fourth Amendment 
doctrine to conform with the realities of the digital age.235  
At the border, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have taken their cue from 
Riley and held that border agents must have reasonable suspicion to 
forensically search electronic devices at the border.236 However, the 
Eleventh Circuit upheld the traditional border search exception and held that 
suspicionless searches of electronic devices are per se reasonable by virtue 
of being at the border.237  
Based on the Supreme Court’s protective treatment of digital data in 
Riley and Carpenter, the high invasiveness of searching electronic devices, 
the traveler’s inability to effectively mitigate the risk to their privacy, and 
the slight burden a reasonable suspicion standard places on governmental 
interests at the border, this Note proposes adopting, at a minimum, a 
reasonable suspicion standard for forensic searches of electronic devices at 
the border.  
The law should go further to require a warrant based on probable cause 
to search electronic devices at the border because of extreme privacy 
interests implicated in searches of electronic devices.238 Furthermore, the 
law should demand that the higher standard for searching electronic devices 
apply to manual and forensic searches alike because the information 
accessible during a manual search implicates many of the same privacy 
interests at issue in a forensic search. 
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235. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2222 (2018); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 
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F.3d 952, 968 (9th Cir. 2013). 
237. United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1229 (11th Cir. 2018). 
238. Though this view is not adopted by any court, a warrant requirement is advocated for by 
Judge Pryor in her dissent in United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1317 (11th Cir. 2018) (Pryor, J., 
dissenting). Various pricavy advocates also believe a warrant should be required to forensically search 
electronic devices at the border. See EFF Amicus Brief, supra note 198, at 2; ACLU Amicus Brief, supra 
note 199, at 3. 
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